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GOVERNING SHARED OFFSHORE ELECTRICITY
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NORTHERN SEAS
VOLKER ROEBEN*
Abstract Through the joint ‘North Seas Countries Oﬀshore Grid Initiative’
the states bordering the North Seas are establishing shared large-scale oﬀshore
electricity infrastructure in order to exploit their oﬀshore wind energy
resources. The article argues that this international governance of oceans
space comes about legally because international law, European law and
national law each fulﬁl a speciﬁc function. The climate regime provides the
normative impetus, the law of the sea allocates competences, and European
law contains principles of cooperation, which are then implemented through
coordinated national law. International law, European law and national law
thus become functionally integrated. This analysis has signiﬁcance beyond
shared oﬀshore electricity infrastructure. It illustrates the way in which the
functional integration of international law, European law and national law is
emerging as a distinct legal institution in its own right, separate and distinct
from the various legal orders themselves.
Keywords: comparative law, concepts of international law, EU law, international
and European energy law, international environmental law, law of the sea,
public international law.
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Global climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time’,1 and
renewable energy from the oceans will play a critical role in mitigating it.2
Exploiting the full potential of marine renewable, and above all, wind energy
requires feeding this electricity into and distributing it through large-scale
oﬀshore infrastructure that spans the marine jurisdictional zones of several
states. Designing, installing and operating such a grid is the purpose of the
‘North Seas Countries Oﬀshore Grid Initiative’ (NSCOGI), signed by the states
* Professor, Swansea University, v.roeben@swansea.ac.uk.
1 The Future We Want, Outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development, para 190, UN General Assembly resolution 66/288, Annex, UN Doc A/RES/66/288
(11 September 2012).
2 The topic of focus of the thirteenth meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 29 May–1 June 2012, was ‘marine
renewable energies’, report on the work of the ICP at its 13th meeting, UN Doc A/67/120, and
report of the Secretary General (UN), Oceans and the Law of the Sea, A/67/79 (31 August 2012).
[ICLQ vol 62, October 2013 pp 839–864] doi:10.1017/S002058931300033X
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 19 Dec 2013 IP address: 137.44.1.153
bordering on the Northern seas, including the UK, and which is to be
implemented by 2030.3 This initiative is not only of high practical importance,
both regionally, for the participating European states,4 and globally, as a test
case in waters with great wind-energy potential, but it is also is an instance of
international governance of shared marine energy infrastructure. This article
examines the legal form of this novel development in ocean governance which,
it is argued, takes the form of international law, European law and coordinated
national law working together, with each of these legal orders fulﬁlling a
speciﬁc function in order to achieve the overall objective of governing shared
marine infrastructure.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II sets out the challenge posed by
shared oﬀshore electricity grids for ocean space governance. Parts III–VI then
explain how the legal response to this challenge combines international,
European and national law. Part III addresses the role of the international
climate regime; Part IV considers the role of the law of the sea; Part V looks at
the contribution of European law; Part VI examines the role of coordinated
national laws. Part VII then analyses the functional integration of international
law, European law and national law as a distinct legal phenomenon. By way of
conclusion, Part VIII seeks to draw more general lessons from the harvesting of
wind energy in the Northern seas for the functional integration of international,
European and national law in other spheres.
II. GOVERNING SHARED OFFSHORE ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Oﬀshore wind energy generation is a commercial reality.5 Yet, exploiting its
full potential does not only depend on the generative capacity. It requires an
oﬀshore electricity infrastructure connecting the wind energy ‘harvested’ in
oﬀshore waters with onshore centres of consumption.6 An oﬀshore electricity
grid links wind farms across jurisdictional zones and aggregates the electricity
3 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the European Commissioner for Energy signed the Political Declaration on
the ‘North Seas Countries’ Oﬀshore Grid Initiative’ on 7 December 2009 (North Sea, the Channel,
Irish Sea, Celtic Sea covering a surface area of about 760,000 km²), <http://www.benelux.int/pdf/
pdf_fr/act/act0170_NorthSeasCountriesOﬀshoreGridInitiativePoliticalDeclaration.pdf> (NSCOGI).
4 See UK Parliament, House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, Energy
and Climate Change: Seventh Report ’A European Supergrid’, September 2011, <http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmenergy/1040/104002.htm> (European
Supergrid Report); European Commission (EU), ‘Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and
Beyond: A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network’ COM (2010) 677, 26 (17
November 2010), approved by the European Council, 4 February 2011, and Council (EU), 28
February 2011 (doc 6207/1/11 REV 1) (Energy infrastructure).
5 European Commission (EU), Renewable Energy: A Major Player in the European Energy
Market, SWD (2012) 163.
6 The European Wind Energy Association, Oceans of Opportunity, 2009, 27, <http://www.
ewea.org/ﬁleadmin/ewea_documents/documents/publications/reports/Oﬀshore_Report_2009.pdf>
(Oceans of Opportunity). The UK’s current Round 3 of wind farm leases extends to the continental
shelf. Denmark has the oﬀshore wind tenders of Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak. In the German
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output of the several production sites,7 thus mitigating the volatility of oﬀshore
wind energy production8 and securing the stability of supply which is critical
for modern economies, an advantage further strengthened if the grid is linked
to onshore energy storage facilities. Such a grid also allows trading in energy
between the producers, enhancing the eﬃciency of oﬀshore wind energy
exploitation and increasing the return on private investments in wind farms.9
The more ‘meshed’ or interconnected the grid is, the greater are the likely gains
from enhanced eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency. Such gains will be greater again if
the grid is extensive in scope, has a large energy capacity and links several
national markets. Designing, installing and operating large-scale oﬀshore
electricity grids has become possible due to the so-called High Voltage Direct
Current (HVDC) technology which permits the transmission of electricity over
long distances. Submarine power cables using this technology are then
interconnected by way of nodes installed on platforms above water.10
However, shared large-scale oﬀshore electricity infrastructure of this nature
cuts across the jurisdictional zones of the various states and thus raises issues
ﬂowing from the international governance of ocean space. Such governance is
based on four legal foundations: ﬁrst, that there is agreement that states ought
to cooperate in the use of ocean space; second, there needs to be a secure
allocation of competences concerning ocean use between states as a
precondition for such cooperation; third, there need to be agreed principles
concerning such cooperation; and fourth, a structure needs to be established
within which coordinated decisions can be taken. The NSCOGI aims to
establish a shared electricity grid across the Northern seas for the harvesting of
its wind energy resources11 and it is premised on the belief that these
foundations can be provided by international law of the climate and of the sea,
European law, and regionally coordinated national law, each of which will be
considered in the following sections.
III. THE IMPETUS FOR GRID GOVERNANCE. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
REGIME
The international climate regime provides the impetus for the participating
states to exploit marine renewable energy through large-scale oﬀshore
EEZ, two clusters are in action, and the large ‘0ﬀshore-Windpark AmrumbankWest’ is planned for
2013–15. 7 Energy infrastructure (n 4) 26.
8 Oceans of Opportunity (n 6) 8–9, 25. 9 Energy Infrastructure (n 4) 26.
10 ENTSO-E, Oﬀshore Transmission Technology (November 2011, update 16 October
2012) 24, <https://www.entsoe.eu/resources/publications/system-development/north-seas-grid-
development> .
11 The wind energy potential of the Northern seas is investigated through EU-funded projects
see Commission (EC), Oﬀshore Wind Energy COM (2008) 768, 9 (13 November 2008). See also
Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Research on Oﬀshore Wind Energy Deployment
signed by Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, December 2007, para 8b, <http://www.
regjeringen.no/upload/OED/pdf%20ﬁler/JointDeclaration-D-S-DK-041207.pdf> .
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electricity infrastructure.12 The use of renewable energy as a climate change
mitigation strategy has been politically required by Agenda 21,13 the
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,14 the outcome document of the
Rio+20 conference on sustainable development,15 as well as by the G8
Heiligendamm process.16 These documents emphasize that advanced technol-
ogy is a key means of implementation.17 The international climate regime
based on the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change18 and the
1997 Kyoto Protocol19 concretizes these non-binding statements and provides
an underpinning of binding international law obligations. Annex I Parties are
responsible for taking the lead in mitigation eﬀorts through binding
international law,20 including quantiﬁed emissions reduction obligations
under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, and this includes the states bordering
the Northern seas.21 Article 2(1)(a)(iv) Kyoto Protocol obliges these states to
meet their climate commitments, inter alia, by promoting, developing and
increasing the use of renewable energies.22 This provision spells out policies
12 Energy security points in the same direction, European Council (EU), Presidency
Conclusions, 19/20 March 2009, Doc 7880/1/09 REV1, paras 24–28; see B Barton, C Redgwell,
A Ronne and DN Zillman (eds), ‘Introduction’ in Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic
Legal and Regulatory Environment (Oxford University Press 2004) 1, 5.
13 Agenda 21, 1992, paras 4.18, 9.9–9.12 and 9.18, in Report of UNCED, vol I Resolutions
Adopted by the Conference, resolution 1, annex II, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26/Rev.1.
14 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
2002, paras 7(e), 9(a) and (c), 20, 59(b) and 62(j), UN Doc A/CONF.199/20.
15 The Future We Want (n 1) para 128.
16 Report of G8 Renewable Energy Task Force, July 2001, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/
meetings-oﬃcial/g8renewables_report.pdf> ; Leaders’ Declaration, Hokkaido Toyako Summit,
Environment and Climate Change, 8 July 2008, para 27, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/
summit/2008/doc/doc080714__en.html> ; Leaders’ Joint Statement: Promoting the Global
Agenda, Annex I ‘Concluding Report of the Heiligendamm Process’, L’Aquila, Italy, 9 July
2009, paras 40–43, <http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/06_Annex_1__HDP_
Concluding.pdf> .
17 The Future We Want (n 1), Annex, para 252; and the initiative of the Secretary-General on
Sustainable Energy for All, referenced in para 129.
18 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 9 May 1992, entered
into force 21 March 1994, 1771 UNTS 107 (FCCC).
19 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted
10 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005, 2303 UNTS 148 (KP).
20 Decision 1/CMP.6, ‘Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Fifteenth Session’, preamble
para 4 (11 December 2010) in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties on its Sixth Session, Addendum, Part Two, Doc FCCC/CP/2010/9/Add.1.
21 For the regime’s future development see the Durban decisions of 11 December 2011 that
foresee a second commitment period from 2013 with QELROs for the EU member states
(Decision 1/CMP.7, ‘Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its Sixteenth Session’ in Report of
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of Parties on its Seventh Session, Addendum,
Part Two, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1).
22 Information on the policies adopted needs to be included in the regular national
communications of Annex I Parties to the FCCC Secretariat.
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and priorities, the furtherance of which is an obligation of conduct over time.23
It includes using technological means as they become available and (ﬂexible)
economic means, including cost-eﬀective transboundary markets.24 Parties
have to cooperate to that end.25 Their cooperation may be aided by the meeting
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, although that has not yet happened.26 The
climate regime thus provides the impetus for a policy of cooperative oﬀshore
wind energy exploitation through ancillary infrastructure. For realizing this
policy objective, however, it looks to external legal frameworks.
IV. COMPETENCES FOR THE GRID. THE LAW OF THE SEA
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea27 lays the groundwork for
such cooperation by determining which state is competent for each element of
an oﬀshore grid with legal certainty.
A. The Applicability of UNCLOS to a New Use of the Oceans?
There are, however, a number of objections to the applicability of the
UNCLOS framework which need to be addressed. First, the use of oﬀshore
grids could not have been foreseen by the drafters of the 1982 Convention,
since both the relevant provisions of climate law and the technological
advances that make this possible had yet to happen. It may then be argued that
a special implementing agreement needs to be negotiated in order to strike an
appropriate balance between the interests at stake, as in the case of the
23 S Oberthür and HE Ott, The Kyoto Protocol (Springer 1999) 103, 110. The negotiating
history of the subchapeau of art (1)(a) Kyoto Protocol reveals that all proposals included a general
commitment to take policies and measures. The uses of not just ‘implement’ but also ‘further
elaborate’ indicate a dynamic character as the outcome of the negotiations. The policies listed in
nos i–viiii are not mandatory but indicative, as reﬂected in the term ‘such as’. See F Depledge,
‘Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article by Article History’, UN Doc FCCC/TP/
2000/2, art 2(1)(a) paras 40, 42, 53. Generally for obligations of conduct ILC Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annexed to GA Resolution 56/117,
Commentary on art 12, para 11, in Report of the ILC, Fifty-third session, UN Doc A/56/10.
24 cf art 2(1)(a)(v) Kyoto Protocol, ‘market instruments’.
25 Art 2(1)(b) ﬁrst sentence Kyoto Protocol in connection with art 4(2)(e)(i) FCCC
requires Annex I Parties to coordinate on renewables, including relevant economic and
administrative instruments. Art 2(1)(b) second sentence Kyoto Protocol covers information
sharing. See F Depledge (n 23) art 2(1)(b) para 8.
26 Art 2(1)(b) third sentence Kyoto Protocol empowers the meeting of the Parties to facilitate
such cooperation, and art 2(4) Kyoto Protocol to coordinate national policies and measures, for
instance through a code of best practice. Cooperation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties on
renewable technology is fostered under art 4(5) FCCC for which an implementing framework was
agreed as part of the Marrakesh Accords. In addition, the cooperative ﬂexible mechanisms
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation apply to renewables, and
methodologies have been developed by the Executive Board of the CDM.
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 10 December 1982, entry into
force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS or Convention).
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Agreement on Part XI or the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.28 However, these
agreements modify or concretize certain Convention provisions or principles
and this does not mean that a special implementing agreement is required
whenever a new use of the ocean arises. Second, it might be objected that
Article 59 of the Convention assumes that there may be lacunae in its allocation
of competences, for instance because of factual developments, that need to be
dealt with on the basis of equity and all relevant circumstances. But Article 59
provides a residual resolution mechanism only in those cases where the
Convention provisions fail to provide an answer after they have been
interpreted in accordance with Articles 31, 32 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,29 including dynamic interpretation in the light of changed
circumstances.30
In the present context, such dynamic interpretation relates to the issue of
whether HVDC power cables can be brought within the UNCLOS framework.
The 1884 Cable Convention, the model for subsequent codiﬁcations of the law
of the sea as regards cables, only concerns communication cables.31 Until
recently, practical interest in cable laying has been focused on such cables
which are today made of ﬁbre glass rather than copper.32 But the 1956 ILC
Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea already extended the notion of cables to
include power cables33 and this understanding informed the 1958 Geneva
Conventions and subsequently UNCLOS.34 Submarine cables within the
28 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI UNCLOS, adopted 28 July 1994, entry
into force 28 July 1996, 1836 UNTS 42; Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
UNCLOS Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, adopted 4 December 1995, entry into force 11 December 2001,
2167 UNTS 88.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done 23 May 1969, entry into force 27 January
1980, 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT).
30 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, ITLOS Sea-bed Disputes Chamber, 1 February 2011,
paras 57–58; Case Concerning the Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (1997)
ICJ Reports 7, para 112.
31 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, adopted 14 March 1884,
entry into force 1 May 1888, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LXXV 357–367; 163 CTS
391, Australian Treaty Series 1901 No 1 (electronic), as amended by the Declaration on the
Protection of Submarine Cables of 1 December 1886 and the Protocol on the Protection of
Submarine Cables of 7 July 1887 (Cable Convention) <http://www.iscpc.org/information/
Convention_on_Protection_of_Cables_1884.pdf> .
32 See S Coﬀen-Smout and G Herbert, ‘Submarine Cables: A Challenge for Ocean
Management’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 441; E Wagner, ‘Submarine Cables and Protections
Provided by the Law of the Sea’ (1995) 19 Marine Policy 127. Submarine cables for climate
monitoring and disaster warning are considered by the ITU, IOC/UNESCO and the World
Meteorological Organization, Oceans and the Law of the Sea (n 2) para 57.
33 ILC Draft Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, art 61(1) read as follows: ‘All States shall
be entitled to lay telegraph, telephone of high-voltage power cables and pipelines on the bed of the
high seas’. See commentary on draft art 61, para 3; commentary on art 27, para 4, in Report of the
ILC, Eighth session, ILC Yb 1956, vol II, Part Two (1956 ILC Draft Articles).
34 Art 61(1) of the ‘Text of the articles’ adopted by the Second Committee of the First UN Law
of Sea Conference only mentions ‘submarine cables’, UN Doc A/CONF.13/L.17/Add.l, Oﬃcial
844 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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meaning of UNCLOS thus already include power cables, including the large
power cables with HVDC technology that will be used in the construction of
any oﬀshore grid. This is an example of the dynamic interpretation of the
Convention to changed factual circumstances. The Convention is therefore
applicable to the central element of oﬀshore grids and consequently to this
novel use of the oceans.
B. Allocating Jurisdiction over Cables, Installations and Wind Energy
The principal contribution of UNCLOS to oﬀshore grid governance lies in
determining the regulatory competence over the individual elements of which
such governance comprises. The Convention does so through its usual sectoral
approach. Under that approach, the Convention allocates jurisdiction to states
for any given ocean use through one of two models: the competence of all
states (the ﬂag state principle) or the competence of a single state, the coastal
state. Since the North Sea is entirely comprised of either the exclusive
economic zones (EEZs) or equivalent zones and the continental shelves of the
states bordering it,35 these zones will be considered in the following two
subsections.
1. The right of all states to lay cables on the continental shelf
The competent regulator for cable laying and operation beyond the territorial
sea is the ﬂag state. This follows from the provisions on submarine cables in
Part VI of the UNCLOS concerning the continental shelf.36 Article 79(1)
grants all states, the coastal state and other states, the right to lay such cables on
the continental shelf, ie to regulate the activity and to reap its beneﬁts. The right
also comprises ancillary operational activities, on the basis of Article 79(2) and
Records, Vol IV, Annex. This was meant to comprise all cables and achieve terminological
uniﬁcation across the articles, see Proposal by USA, Doc A/CONF.13/C.2/L.108; and the earlier
proposal by Italy, Doc A/CONF.13/C.2/L.102. The previous debate in the committee had shown
the extension of the right to lay cables to power cables as suggested by the 1956 ILC Articles to be
uncontroversial, Oﬃcial Records, 30th meeting, para 16 (France); para 18 (Italy), para 22
(Venezuela). The uniform terminology of submarine cables was then retained in arts 2, 26 of the
High Seas Convention and art 4 of the Continental Shelf Convention.
35 The United Kingdom has claimed an ‘Exclusive Fisheries Zone’ under the Fisheries Act
1976 section 1, where it exercises rights equivalent to an EEZ in the water column. Sections 84–89
of the UK Energy Act 2004 (EA 2004) established Renewable Energy Zones (REZ), founded in
art 56(1)(a) UNCLOS. Schedule 4 para 1 of the UKMarine and Coastal Access Act 2009 amended
EA 2004 section 84(4) so that REZ and EEZ now are basically identical; see G Plant, ‘Oﬀshore
Renewable Energy: Smooth Permitting, Environmental Assessment and Fair Use Allocation’
(2003) 13 Journal of Water Law 85.
36 Literature on submarine cables let alone high voltage power cables is scant. Recent
contributions are C Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in M Roggenkamp,
C Redgwell, I Del Guayo and A Rønne (eds), Energy Law in Europe (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 13,
63–4; R Zeuschner, ‘Pipelines and Cables: The Oﬀshore Transportation of Oil, Gas and Renewable
Energy’ (2011) International Energy Law Review 311.
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(5), which guarantee unimpeded maintenance and repair of cables. In line with
historical developments,37 Article 79 thus safeguards the right of cable laying
on the continental shelf, which is deﬁned generally by Article 87(1)(c) as a
high seas freedom and is strengthened by Article 112 which provides a ‘right’
to lay cables on the seabed of the high seas which is opposable to other states
and enforceable against private actors.38 As is the nature of all high seas rights
and freedoms, the ﬂag state principle applies and it is the ﬂag state, be it a
coastal or other state, which has the authority to regulate cable laying by
persons under its jurisdiction.
All states may thus lay cables freely on any continental shelf without having
to consult on the delineation of the course of the cable. The coastal state must
give its consent.39 Whilst the coastal state may impose reasonable restrictions
on cable laying in order to safeguard its exclusive rights to explore the
continental shelf and to exploit its resources, according to Article 79(2) these
restrictions must not impede the laying or maintenance of cables by ﬂag states.
The coastal state cannot take measures to prevent pollution from cables, nor
can it determine the course of any cables laid on its continental shelf by other
states. This results from the clear wording of Article 79(2), (3) which, whilst
granting these rights to coastal states in relation to pipelines on its continental
shelf, does not do so as regards cables. This bifurcation may surprise. Yet the
Convention’s negotiating history ‘conﬁrms’ within the meaning of Article 32
VCLT that it was indeed intended that the general rights of the coastal state to
reduce pollution and to delineate courses should only apply to pipelines and
not cables. A proposal made in the Sea-Bed Committee had sought to make the
delineation of the course of both pipelines and submarine cables by a foreign
state subject to coastal state consent.40 Indeed, this had already been suggested
by the ILC in its 1956 commentary on draft Article 61(2), paragraph 3, but this
was not reﬂected in Article 4 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. At
UNCLOS III, the draft produced by the Evensen group of juridical experts only
required coastal state consent for the delineation of the course of pipelines and
only referred to the prevention of pollution from pipelines by coastal states.41 It
is not apparent why the Evensen group restricted the requirement of coastal
state consent to the delineation of the course of pipelines. The fact that the draft
also provided for coastal state control over pollution from pipelines suggests
37 cf Cable Convention (n 31) art I.
38 See RR Churchill and AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press
1999) 205–7, 455 (cable laying freedom of ‘immersion’ involving the seabed).
39 See 1956 ILC Draft Articles (n 33), commentary on art 61(2)—which corresponds to art
79(2) UNCLOS: ‘(t)he coastal State is obliged to permit the laying of cables’.
40 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, vol V, UNGA, Oﬃcial Records, Twenty-eighth Session,
Supplement No 21 (A/9021) (China).
41 The Continental Shelf (1075, mimeo.) art 6 (Informal Group of Juridical Experts),
reproduced in R Platzöder, Third United Nations Law of the Sea: Documents vol XI (Oceana
Publications 1987) 501, 502.
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that it was concerned about the speciﬁc environmental pollution threat which
they posed, with this justifying extending coastal state powers over pipelines
but not over cables. The Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) followed the
Evensen draft.42 Coastal state eﬀorts at the conference were then concentrated
on making the laying of pipelines subject to coastal state consent.43 It was
argued that there was ‘a very great diﬀerence between the laying of a cable and
the laying of a pipeline’, presumably with respect to the potential harm that
pipeline spillage may cause to the coastal state’s marine environment.44 The
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), which contained what, in
essence, became Article 79 of the Convention, continued to only require that
the coastal state consent to the delineation of the course of a pipeline traversing
its continental shelf.45
This is conﬁrmed by the structure of Article 79(4) which sets out the
competences of the coastal state in respect of cables. Cables may only enter in a
coastal state’s territorial sea with its consent, and this also covers grid cables
connecting to a landing point onshore. Thus, unlike the continental shelf, states
have to obtain the consent of the coastal state to lay a cable within its territorial
sea, and the coastal state may set conditions regarding the route of the cable
and impose transit charges.46 This would also apply to interconnector cables
between two countries that connect to the national grid of a coastal state.47
According to Article 79(4), the coastal state has jurisdiction over those cables
used ‘in connection’ with the ‘exploration and exploitation of the shelf’s
natural resources’. This does not cover grid cables serving wind energy
harvested above water. However, the coastal state also has jurisdiction over
cables used ‘in connection’ with ‘the operation of artiﬁcial islands, installations
and structures under its jurisdiction’. Wind farms located on the continental
shelf are examples of such installations and cables connecting such wind farms
to an oﬀshore electricity grid are ancillary to them. As a consequence, the
coastal state has jurisdiction over such export cables, including the delineation
of their course.48 Since the large interconnector cables between states and the
42 A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1/Part II, art 65.
43 Proposal by Denmark (1977) (mimeo.) art 67 (RSNT II), reproduced in IV Platzöder
(n 41) 470.
44 138th plenary meeting (1980) para 150, XIV Oﬀ. Rec. 61 (Denmark).
45 A/CONF.62/WP.10 (ICNT, 1977) art 79, VIII Oﬀ. Rec. 1, 17.
46 The coastal state may in turn provide for their protection limiting innocent passage, art
21(1)(c). A vessel used for laying cables is not in innocent passage within the meaning of art 19, see
M Mudric´, ‘Rights of States Regarding Underwater Cables and Pipelines’ (2010) 29 Australian
Resources Energy Law Journal 235, 236.
47 In the case of the 2011 UK–Netherlands Interconnector ‘BritNed’ the respective national
TSOs formed a joint venture to fund and operate the interconnection, which was licensed by both
the UK and the Netherlands. The ‘NordLink’ interconnector from Norway to Germany planned to
be laid on the Norwegian, German and Danish continental shelves is registered in Norway and will
require licensing both there and in Germany.
48 This is also practice of the oﬀshore wind generation projects in the Northern seas, where
foreign producers have assumed responsibility also for the oﬀshore grid system, while the national
TSO is responsible for the onshore connection. Examples are ‘Rödsand II’, which lies between the
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platform to grid connections do not serve to ‘operate’ speciﬁc wind farms, they
do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state, but under the
normal rules of ﬂag state jurisdiction. The Convention thus attributes cable
laying competences on the continental shelf on the basis of traditional high
seas freedoms, with functionally limited exclusive coastal state rights. The
Convention provides a coordinating mechanism in respect of the overlapping
rights by states, by stipulating in Article 79(5) that all states engaged in laying
cables must have due regard for cables already in position, as well as not
prejudice the repair of existing cables.49 Article 58 also safeguards the high
seas freedom of all states, including the coastal state, to lay cables in the water
column of the EEZ. Article 58 accords Article 79 lex specialis status for cables
insofar as the continental shelf is concerned50 and addresses both the laying
and the subsequent operation of submarine cables from specialized ships. The
operation of the submarine cable is a ‘lawful use of the sea related’ to the
freedom of cable laying and according to Article 58(2) the ﬂag state is
exclusively competent to prescribe and enforce the rules that fall within the
scope of Articles 113–115. Accordingly, the ﬂag state is to enact those laws
and regulations ‘necessary’ to ensure protection of cables from interference by
private parties.51 These are obligations of conduct for the ﬂag states.52 The ﬂag
state is also required, by Article 58(3), to ensure that those involved in cable
laying comply with coastal state laws and regulations pertaining to the water
column.53 Such rules may relate to the exclusive rights and competences of the
coastal state for the exploitation of the natural resources of the EEZ and the
protection of its marine environment. Such coastal state rules are to be
complied with if they are ‘in accordance with the Convention’ or ‘other rules of
international law not incompatible’ with Article 58(1).54 By binding coastal
German island of Fehmarn and the Danish island of Lolland and ‘London Array’ in the Thames
Estuary.
49 cf Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ITLOS case No 16 (14 March 2012), paras
475–476, for due regard obligations of states under the Convention.
50 This follows from the cross-reference of art 58(1) to art 87(1)(c), which subjects the freedom
to lay cables on the continental shelf to Part VI. But see also D Nelson, ‘Submarine Cables and
Pipelines’ in R-J Dupuy and D Vignes (eds), A Handbook on the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoﬀ
1991) vol II, 977, 986, who sees art 56(3) as pertinent. But art 56 does not cover cable laying.
51 See Churchill and Lowe (n 38) 209. Cable Convention (n 31) art VIII, also allocates
jurisdiction on these matters to the ﬂag state.
52 cf Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), (2010) ICJ
Reports 14, para 187; Responsibilities Opinion (n 30) para 111.
53 See Mudric´ (n 46) 247–8; MP Green and DR Burnett, ‘Security of International Submarine
Cable Infrastructure: Time to Rethink’ in MH Nordquist, R Wolfrum, J Norton Moore and R Long
(eds), Legal Challenges in Maritime Security (Martinus Nijhoﬀ 2008) 557; S Kaye, ‘International
Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from Attack’ (2007) 31
TulMarLJ 377, 398.
54 For the Northern seas states, European law on the marine environment and namely the
Directive (EC) No 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and ﬂora, [1992]
OJ L 206/7 may be such rules of international law not incompatible with art 58(1).
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state powers in this way, Article 58(3) ensures that rules adopted by coastal
states under Article 56 do not unduly interfere with the right of ﬂag states to lay
cables under Article 58(1). Article 79(5) on due regard for all cables, Article
79(2) on safeguarding mineral exploitation rights and Article 58(3) then
provide the bases for the coastal state to balance the right to lay cables on the
continental shelf with competing uses of the seabed and the water column.55
The UNCLOS regime is therefore suﬃciently ﬂexible to absorb these
technological developments within Article 79(1)–(5) and the need for
coordination with competing uses of the sea. This is particularly important
since it is unclear whether Article 79 in part or as a whole reﬂects customary
international law. The recent ICJ judgment in Colombia/Nicaragua empha-
sizes that ‘several of the most important provisions’ of UNCLOS are reﬂective
of customary international law,56 and it acknowledges that a Convention
provision can form an ‘indivisible regime’ in customary law.57 That might be
relevant to Article 79, paragraph 1 of which is arguably fundamental and
paragraphs 2–5 of which might then form part of an ‘indivisible regime’,58
although views in the literature are divided on this.59
2. Exclusive competences of the coastal state for wind energy exploitation
and connector nodes of the grid
In sharp contrast with the law on cables, UNCLOS provides that the coastal
state is the sole competent regulator for both the wind energy fed into the grid
and the above water connector nodes of the grid. The lead provisions on these
uses of the water column are found in Part V on the EEZ, which provides that
the coastal state has the exclusive right to exploit the non-living resources of
the water column, including wind energy.60 This pertains both to regulation of
wind energy production and reaping its economic value when fed into a grid.
55 The UK Crown Estate’s permission is needed for the rights to lay, maintain and operate
cables and pipelines on the seabed within 12 nm for which it is landlord. It only asks to be informed
of cables and pipelines that transit the UK continental shelf, as other activities may be impacted.
Other states such as Germany pursuant to the Federal Law on Mining subject all cables to an
authorization procedure in regard to conﬂicting activities. The ‘NorNed’ interconnector cable from
Netherlands to Norway thus required authorization to transit the German EEZ. For practice in Asia
see Y Takei, ‘Law and Policy for International Submarine Cables in the Asia-Paciﬁc Region’,
AsianSIL Working Paper 2010/13, fns 39–42.
56 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012
(nyr) para 138. 57 Para 139 (there Art 121 paras 1 through 3 on islands).
58 A Party to UNCLOS may be required to comply with art 79 even vis-à-vis a non-Party given
the Convention’s forming the ‘legal order’ of the oceans; cf Colombia v Nicaragua, para 126.
59 Compare R Beckman, ‘Submarine Cables: A Critically Important but Neglected Area of the
Law of the Sea’, Indian Society of International Law, 7th International Conference on Legal
Regimes of Sea, Air, Space and Antarctica, 15–17 January 2010, New Delhi, 3 with DR Burnett,
‘Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, October 2007, 2–3.
60 UNCLOS, art 56(1)(a). cf D Leary and M Esteban, ‘Climate Change and Renewable Energy
from the Ocean and Tides: Calming the Sea of Regulatory Uncertainty’ (2009) 24 International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 617, 617.
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The coastal state is the sole competent regulator for the above water connector
nodes of oﬀshore grids, since these ‘installations or structures’ facilitate the
commercial exploitation of wind energy harvested in the EEZ and thus the
economic exploitation of the EEZ, in accordance with Articles 60(1)(b) and 56
(1)(a). The coastal state’s comprehensive rights in relation to such installations
are set out in detail in Article 60(2)–(8), which, by virtue of Article 80, are also
applicable to the continental shelf.61
3. Marine environmental protection
Determining which state has competence in respect of the various elements of
the grid is the critical connecting factor as regards the obligations contained in
the Convention regarding marine environmental protection. Part XII UNCLOS
imposes on all states parties the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.62 This is balanced with the duty to respect the rights of third
states, provided for in Article 194(4). This general obligation is concretized
by a series of speciﬁc standards that are applicable to oﬀshore electricity
infrastructure. They relate to: controlling pollution of the marine environment,
including the introduction of ‘energy’ (Article 1(1), (4)); controlling pollution
from ‘the use of technologies under their jurisdiction or control’ (Article
196(1)), which includes HVDC technology; minimizing pollution ‘to the
fullest possible extent’ from ‘installations and devices’ operating in the marine
environment (Article 194(3)(d)). ‘Installations’ include the nodes and plat-
forms of the grid and the term ‘devices’ might be understood to extend to
cables. This follows from Article 194(3)(c) on ‘devices’ used for the resources
of the sea-bed.
Protection and preservation of the marine environment in this respect
encompasses measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies,
ensuring the safety of operations, and regulating the design, equipment, and
operation of such installations or devices. Measures must also be taken in the
planning and operation of the oﬀshore grid to protect and preserve rare or
fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species and other forms of marine life (Article 194(5)). These are obligations
of due diligence that depend on the level of risk and the activities involved
and may vary over time.63 They are concretized by supplementary principles
such as ‘use of best environmental techniques’64 and ‘the precautionary
approach’.65 The Convention also prescribes the use of environmental impact
61 cf KN Scott, ‘Tilting at Oﬀshore Windmills: Regulating Wind Farm Development within the
Renewable Energy Zone’ (2006) 18 JEL 89, 96.
62 UNCLOS, art 192.
63 Responsibilities Opinion (n 30) paras 117–120. Including safe navigation, see IMO
resolution A. 671(16) of 19 October 1989 on safety zones and safety of navigation around oﬀshore
installations and structures. 64 Responsibilities Opinion paras 122, 136.
65 Responsibilities Opinion paras 122, 135.
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assessments, if only in general terms.66 The national legislation to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from the seabed-
related activity of the grid must be ‘no less eﬀective than international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures’.67 These standards are
subject to continuous development by competent organizations.
C. Developing International Grid Governance under the Law of the Sea
It emerges from the above that, with certain exceptions, the Convention
provides that cable laying in the EEZ or continental shelf is the right of every
state, while wind energy exploitation and regulation of above water
installations are exclusive coastal state rights. This right of all states to lay
cables in the EEZ of coastal states is judicially enforceable through the
procedures of Part XV Section 2 (Article 297(1)(a)), as is the concomitant
obligation of the ﬂag state to comply with coastal state laws when doing so
(Article 297(1)(b)). The Convention approach is thus one of ‘nationalizing’
energy infrastructure rather than submitting it to an ‘internationalizing’
regulatory principle. The former refers to empowering individual states to act
in their national interest, the latter to states acting in a common interest.68
Consequently, matters concerning energy infrastructure are covered by
national law, and there is as yet almost no international law directly applicable
to marine (renewable) energy or on transmission infrastructure.69 Exercising
their competences under the Convention, the states bordering the Northern seas
have so far encouraged national point-to-point solutions connecting their
oﬀshore wind farms with one national onshore landing point.70
National regulation of ocean space uses will often yield overall eﬃcient
outcomes.71 Yet, as the eﬃcient exploitation of oﬀshore wind energy depends
on large-scale electricity infrastructure, states need to cooperate across
jurisdictional zones on the basis of a common objective and by coordinating
the exercise of their respective rights over wind energy, cables, and
installations accordingly. This is certainly so for states operating in the
particular geographical context of the Northern seas and in comparable
66 UNCLOS, art 206 and customary international law give little guidance on their conduct,
Responsibilities Opinion (n 30) para 149; cf Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 52) para 205.
67 cf UNCLOS, art 208(3); also art 211(2).
68 See R Wolfrum, Die Internationalisierung staatsfreier Räume (Springer 1984).
69 For renewable energy Leary and Esteban (n 60) 617; A M-Z Gao and K Y-C Juang, ‘The
International Legal Regime on the Exploitation of Oﬀshore Geothermal, Wave, Tidal and OTEC
Energy: In Search of Legal Challenges and Solutions’ (2006) 24 International Energy Law and
Taxation Review 267. For non-renewable energy further E Üsenmez, ‘The UK’s Energy Security’
in J Paterson, G Gordon and E Üsenmez (eds), Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging
Trends (Dundee University Press 2011) 33.
70 See Oﬀshore Transmission Technology (n 10).
71 See E Posner and A Sykes, ‘Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea’ (2011)
104 AJIL 569.
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settings. But in principle this holds true whenever states intend eﬃciently to
exploit their oﬀshore wind energy resources.72 Such cooperation includes joint
planning of a grid, authorization and regulatory oversight, and transborder cost
sharing. No conﬂict with UNCLOS arises, since Parties remain free to exercise
their conventional rights in any way they prefer, including cooperatively. To
the contrary, the Convention provides the basis for cooperation by determining
in a legally certain manner what each state may do in regard to oﬀshore
electricity infrastructure.
The question then is whether UNCLOS also contains a model for the
cooperative exercise of these competences. While the Convention speciﬁes a
range of models for cooperative oceans governance, none of them ﬁts here. It is
true that the North Sea meets the deﬁnition of an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea
contained in Article 122.73 Article 123 provides that the states bordering such
seas should cooperate in the exercise of their ‘rights’ under the Convention.
But Article 123 only addresses the management of living resources and marine
environmental protection, subject matters that are also the object of other
provisions concerning cooperation elsewhere in the Convention. Marine
renewable energy exploitation by means of cables and installations does not
ﬁgure here. Nor can it be brought in through interpretation. Arguments for an
extensive interpretation could be based on Article 31(1) VCLT, according to
which UNCLOS and its individual provisions need to be seen in light of their
object and purpose,74 or on the basis of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, which requires
that account be taken of external ‘relevant rules of international law applicable
in the relations between the parties’, including other conventions,75 such as
international climate regime based demands for cooperation on marine
renewable exploitation. Both arguments presuppose that the treaty provision
under consideration is open textured,76 which is the case for Article 123
UNCLOS. Yet neither Article 31(1) nor Article 31(3)(c) VCLT may be used to
turn treaty law on its head,77 which would be the result if Part XI UNCLOS
72 For wind energy projects in Asian-Paciﬁc countries supported by regional cooperation see
M Esteban and D Leary, ‘Current Developments and Future Prospects of Oﬀshore Wind and Ocean
Energy’ (2012) 90 Journal of Applied Energy 128. Cooperative fora on oﬀshore grids would be the
International Renewable Energy Agency and the International Energy Agency; cf Oceans and the
Law of the Sea (n 2) para 61.
73 P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP
2009) 394.
74 cf Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 52) paras 58–63.
75 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v USA), (2003) ICJ Reports 161, para 41; Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay (n 52) para 66.
76 ILC Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law, Diﬃculties Arising from the
Diversiﬁcation and Expansion of International Law, Report, para 467, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, and
Draft Conclusions, para 20(a), UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1, in Report of the ILC, Fifty-eighth
session, UN Doc A/61/10; ILC Yb 2006, vol. II, Part Two (Report on Fragmentation).
77 cf Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v Belgium), Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, (2002) ICJ
Reports 86, para 79; Report on Fragmentation, paras 473–475.
852 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 19 Dec 2013 IP address: 137.44.1.153
were extended to matters that the Convention otherwise makes subject to
national regulation.78 State practice corroborates this analysis, for instance,
cooperative action under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic has been limited to setting marine
environmental standards for wind farms.79 Finally, the Convention does not
contain a general obligation for its Parties to cooperate.80 Of course, the
obligation to cooperatively protect the marine environment from the eﬀects of
any use of the sea in transborder settings is well established both under the
Convention and under customary international law.81 But this obligation
cannot easily be extended to cooperation on using the oceans to mitigate
climate change,82 and, in any event, it does not establish benchmarks for such
cooperative action in this matter.
Yet the Convention is not a closed catalogue as regards cooperative oceans
governance. To the contrary it is open towards novel forms. This openness is
reﬂected in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, which seeks to proceduralize and operationalize the idea of cooperation on
ocean matters of common concern.83 This includes regional mechanisms such
as the European Union (EU).
78 The MOX Plant Arbitration (2003) demonstrated diﬀering views about the implications of
UNCLOS, art 123 for regional cooperation. But even Ireland’s argument that the UK was
insuﬃciently cooperative on measures to defend against terrorist attacks on the Sellaﬁeld nuclear
plant turned on the attendant environmental obligations of the UK, rather than on nuclear energy
use as such. Permanent Court of Arbitration, MOX Plant Case (Ireland v UK) (2003, withdrawn);
ITLOS, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) Case No 10
(3 December 2001).
79 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
adopted 22 September 1992, entry into force 25 March 1998 (OSPAR). OSPAR has issued
guidance on the location, operation and removal of oﬀshore wind farms, including associated
power cables, OSPAR ‘Guidance on Environmental Considerations for Oﬀshore Wind Farm
Development’ (2008-3). OSPAR’s deﬁnitions of oﬀshore installations and oﬀshore pipelines
underscore its restricted remit, see Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Oﬀshore Installations,
excluding ‘any part of an oﬀshore installation which is located below the surface of the sea-bed’.
80 UNCLOS sets forth discrete cooperative obligations. The Responsibilities Opinion (n 30)
paras 142–143, for instance, identiﬁes the obligation for states to cooperate with the International
Seabed Authority.
81 The MOX Plant Case (n 78), para 82; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore
in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) (Provisional Measures), ITLOS Case
No 12 (8 October 2003) para 92.
82 Art 2(2) Kyoto Protocol contains an obligation to cooperate through the IMO on mitigating
the climate impact of navigational uses of the sea. MARPOL 71/78, Annex VI was amended in
2006 to extend to greenhouse gas emissions other than exhaust. In July 2011, the 62nd session of
the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee adopted further amendments in the form of
the mandatory Energy Eﬃciency Design Index for new ships. At its 63rd session in 2012, the
Committee considered complementary market-based measures, MEPC 63/23, section 5.
83 This rationale runs through the jurisprudence of the ITLOS. In the Southern Blueﬁn Tuna
Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures), ITLOS Case Nos 3 & 4
(27 August 1999), parties were to cooperate on living resources management through the SBT
Conservation Convention. Straits of Johor (n 81) suggests means of cooperatively delimiting a
maritime boundary. Similarly, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 52) para 77 envisages states
jointly managing a shared river environment; also Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros (n 30) paras 140–141.
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V. PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION. THE EUROPEAN LAW FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE
ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE
Establishing international grid governance requires a set of principles. As such,
principles are not yet available internationally, they must be generated de novo
in appropriate fora, such as the European Union.
A. Absorbing Climate Priorities within European Law
The EU is indeed obligated to further climate objectives. The EU and its
member states are party to both the Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the Kyoto Protocol, and they are to meet their quantiﬁed emission
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol jointly.84 As a matter of
political prioritization as to how best to achieve these objectives, European
secondary law has absorbed the climate regime’s goal of mitigation through
renewable energies set forth in Article 2(a)(iv) of the Kyoto Protocol.85
Directive 2009/28 sets out the legally binding target that 20 per cent of the
overall energy consumption in the EU is to be from renewable energies by
2020.86 Annex I sets a binding target for each member state to be translated
into national renewable energy action plans.87 The directive permits ﬂexibility
mechanisms which allow member states to support renewable generation
outside their borders through ‘statistical transfers’ and ‘joint projects’ with
another member state or a third state, and two or more may develop joint
support schemes.88 Much of this renewable energy is expected to be coming
from the Northern seas on the basis of a shared oﬀshore grid.89
84 The Kyoto Protocol was approved by Council Decision 2002/358/EC concerning the
approval, on behalf of the EC, of the Kyoto Protocol and the joint fulﬁlment of commitments
thereunder, [2002] OJ L 130/1. Art 4 Kyoto Protocol is the international basis for the EU’s internal
burden sharing. See Joanne Scott, ‘The Multi-level Governance of Climate Change’, in P Craig and
G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011), 805, 807.
85 See Commission (EC), Analysis of Options to Move Beyond 20% Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reductions and Assessing the Risk of Carbon Leakage COM (2010) 265 (26 May 2010).
86 Directive (EC) No 2009/28 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
and amending and subsequently repealing Directives (EC) 2001/77 and 2003/30/EC, [2009] OJ L
140/16, art 3. This is part of the Europe 2020 strategy to reduce CO2 emissions by 20 per cent and
obtain 20 per cent energy from renewables by 2020, European Council, 8/9 March 2007,
Presidency Conclusions, Doc 7224/1/07 REV. The EU is on track to meet these targets,
Commission (EU), A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050 COM
(2011) 112 (8 March 2011), p 3.
87 The national target of the UK is 15 per cent.
88 Directive 2009/28 (n 86) arts 6, 7, 8, 9 and art 11.
89 Commission (EC), Oﬀshore Wind Energy: Action Needed to Deliver on the Energy Policy
Objectives for 2020 and Beyond COM 2008(768) (13 November 2008); European Supergrid
Report (n 4) paras 20–23.
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B. Developing Principles of Oﬀshore Grid Governance
In line with these priorities, the EU has been developing principles for oﬀshore
grid governance. It is a party to UNCLOS, as are all its member states,90 and in
the internal division of competences between the EU and its member states
implementation of the Convention becomes a European competence to the
extent that the Union actually passes legislation on the basis of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).91 It has relevant competences
in the areas of the internal market,92 trans-European energy infrastructures,93
environmental protection94 and now also energy policy.95 European legislation
under these shared competences (Article 4 TFEU) extends to the EEZs and
continental shelves of the member states.96 Thus, European harmonization of
market access and regulatory regimes for the internal electrical energy market
is applicable oﬀshore.97 Of particular importance to the oﬀshore grid is
Electricity Directive 2009/72 concerning common rules for the internal market
in electricity which unbundles ownership of electricity generation from
ownership and operation of transmission-systems and from the supply to end-
customers. Regulation 714/2009 requires Transmission Systems Operators
(TSOs) to cooperate on regional and European 10-year network development
plans for electricity in the framework of the ‘European Network of TSOs’
(ENTSO-E) and develop ‘network codes’, which are of critical importance to
the oﬀshore grid. Regulation 713/2009 requires national regulators to
cooperate on cross-border investments such as the grid within the ‘Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators’ (ACER), and deﬁnes conditions for
access to cross-border electricity transmission networks. Yet enhanced
eﬃciency of the electricity energy market will not by itself bring about the
interconnected energy infrastructure needed to absorb increasing electricity
90 UNCLOS was approved by Council Decision 98/392 concerning the conclusion by the EC
of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof, [1998] OJ
L 179/1. The Convention is a mixed agreement binding both the EU and its member States. The EU
is recognized in UNCLOS, art 305(1)(f), Annex IX, art 1.
91 [2010] OJ C 83/01, entry into force 1 December 2009. See Case C-459/03 Commission v
Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, para 108; otherwise, member states remain competent for
implementing the Convention, para 107. UNCLOS then becomes European law falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court, paras 123. However, UNCLOS as European law cannot be
directly enforced before EU or national courts, Case C-308/06, Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR
I-4057, paras 64–65. 92 TFEU, art 114.
93 TFEU, arts 170–172. 94 TFEU, arts 191–193.
95 TFEU, art 194, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon [2007] OJ C 306, entry into force 1
December 2009.
96 Case C-6/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2005] ECR I-9017, para 117.
97 The third internal electricity energy market package of 2009 consists of Directive (EC)
No 2009/72 ([2009] OJ L 211/55 and Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, [2009] OJ L 211/1 and 714/
2009, [2009] OJ L 211/15. For oﬀshore applicability: UKOﬃce of the Gas and Electricity Markets,
‘Oﬀshore Electricity Transmission: Further Consultation on the Enduring Regulatory Regime’,
p 12, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/42543/424-
condoc-oﬀshore-electricity-transmission.pdf> .
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generation from renewables. For that purpose, the European Commission’s
Second Strategic Energy Review (2008) ﬁrst identiﬁed the objective of
oﬀshore grid development in the Northern seas,98 an objective that has been
concretized through subsequent European law-making. In 2010 the
Commission tabled the so-called European Energy Infrastructure Package
that sets out a list of priority trans-European electricity networks, including an
oﬀshore grid across the Northern seas.99 In 2011, it proposed a Regulation on
trans-European electricity infrastructure under Articles 172, 288(1) TFEU,
which was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in March
2013.100 Regulation 347/2013 deﬁnes a toolbox for projects of common
interests within identiﬁed priority electricity corridors, of which the ‘Northern
Seas oﬀshore grid’ is one.101 It envisages regional groups formed by member
states, with the Commission participating in the planning and governance of
such transnational electricity infrastructure. Its common regime includes rules
on authorization and, critically for there to be trade in renewables through the
grid, the regulation of cross-border cost allocation. Coordination of national
authorization processes is envisaged, with each member state designating one
national competent authority which will be responsible for facilitating and
coordinating the permit granting process for projects of common interest and
issuing a comprehensive decision, along with the introduction of time limits
and guidelines. The Regulation retains the standard regulatory model of
electricity infrastructure based on regulated tariﬀs collected from the users (the
‘user pays’ principle). National regulators are to agree on common principles in
relation to cost-allocation of interconnection investments and related tariﬀs.
While infrastructure development is to be largely private investment driven, a
separate regulation will make supporting European funding available.102
The European regulatory framework thus deﬁnes relevant principles of grid
cooperation, but not their application to individual oﬀshore energy infrastruc-
ture projects. This is due to the division of competences between the Union and
98 Commission (EC), An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. Second Strategic
Energy Review COM (2008) 781 (13 November 2008), approved by the Council (EC), 19 February
2009 (Press release 6670/09).
99 Energy infrastructure (n 4) 25–8. Renewables electricity generation is expected to more than
double from 2007 to 2020 of which up to 12 per cent are expected to come from oﬀshore notably
the Northern seas, 6, 21.
100 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the EP and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines
for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending
Regulations 713/2009/EC 714/2009 and 715/2009/EC, OJ L 115/39, so that the ﬁrst list of projects
of common interest to implement this priority corridor can be established by 30 September 2013.
101 Annex I of the Regulation deﬁnes it as an ‘integrated oﬀshore electricity grid in the North
Sea, the Irish Sea, the English Channel, the Baltic Sea and neighbouring waters to transport
electricity from renewable oﬀshore energy sources to centres of consumption and storage and to
increase cross-border electricity exchange’.
102 Commission (EU), Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the Connecting Europe Facility
COM (2011) 665 (19 October 2011). The Council agreed on a partial general approach on the
proposed regulation at ﬁrst reading, Doc 10479/12 (7/8 June 2012).
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its member states. Article 171(1), (2) TFEU empowers the Union to determine
priorities for trans-European networks and to regulate the relevant prin-
ciples.103 The extent of European harmonization of the national procedures is
subject to subsidiarity control under Article 5(3) Treaty on European Union
(TEU).104 And planning, authorization, and regulation of the grid with the
associate cable laying and any oﬀshore installations remain with the member
states, as does oﬀshore wind energy policy.105 The European legislation on
principles for cooperative grid governance thus needs to be complemented by
action of the littoral states of the Northern seas.106 These in turn have absorbed
the objective of increased use of marine renewables in their own national
legislation.107 The existing national infrastructure comprises radial links
connecting oﬀshore generation to the onshore grid and interconnectors. In
most states the national Transmission Systems Operators play a signiﬁcant role
in the planning, ﬁnancing, construction and ownership of oﬀshore infrastruc-
ture, while one or more government ministries are responsible for site
identiﬁcation and regulation of oﬀshore generation.108 Accordingly, the
functional licensing procedure for the right of the TSO to own and operate
transmission assets needs to be distinguished from the general planning and
consent procedures.109
103 cf Commission (EU), Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Guidelines for Trans-European
Energy Infrastructure and Repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC SEC(2011) 1233, 22.
104 [2010] OJ C 83/01, entry into force 1 December 2009.
105 TFEU, art 194(2) guarantees each member state the ‘right to determine the conditions for
exploiting its energy resources’.
106 From the perspective of the EU, this is also an eﬃciency consideration as decentralized
decision-making allows for experimentation; see B Eberlein, ‘Experimentalist Governance in the
Energy Sector’ in C Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union:
Towards a New Architecture (OUP 2010) 61.
107 Art 22 of Directive 2009/28 (n 86) requires member states to submit a report to the
Commission on progress in the promotion and use of energy from renewable sources by 31
December 2011, and every two years thereafter. The reports are available at <http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm> . For use of renewables as part of their climate policies,
see also the latest (ﬁfth) national communications of Annex I Parties under the FCCC, <http://
unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/4903.php> . The key UK
legislation is the 2008 Energy Act.
108 Comprehensively NSCOGI, Working Group 2 Market and Regulatory Issues, Final Report
Deliverable 1, Incompatibility of national market and regulatory regimes (13 January 2012),
<http://www.benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_D1_Final.pdf> . In Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, and Sweden oﬀshore extension of the national onshore grid is the responsibility of the
national TSOs, while in Belgium and the Netherlands grid development is the responsibility of the
wind farm developer, and the UK tenders the connection of each new oﬀshore wind farm
separately, cf Energy infrastructure (n 4), 26; R Tscherning, ‘The European Oﬀshore Supergrid
and the Expansion of Oﬀshore Wind Energy in Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom’ (2011)
20 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 76, 79.
109 Twenties-project: Oﬀshore Interconnectors: Challenges and Barriers for Consenting (31
May 2011) 11, <http://www.twenties-project.eu/node/18> .
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VI. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NSCOGI AS A REGIONAL
GROUP
Regulation 347/2013 envisages regional groups as the governance structure for
the transnational electricity infrastructure. This dovetails with the existing
practice of the Northern seas bordering states cooperating on marine renewable
energy matters within the intergovernmental Pentalateral Energy Forum. In
December 2009, these states signed the political Declaration on the North Sea
Countries Oﬀshore Grid Initiative, which Norway, as a non-EU member but a
key player because of its hydro-storage capacities, joined later.110 The
NSCOGI envisages a private-investment driven oﬀshore grid with a time
horizon of 2030 under a common framework relating to planning,
authorization, regulation and investment. It is a forum for cooperation chaired
by the participating governments on a rotating basis, assisted by the Benelux
secretariat. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the
participating states at the end of 2010 operationalizes this oﬀshore
infrastructure initiative.111 It establishes a regional governance structure
aimed at the coordinated exercise by the participating states of their
UNCLOS rights with respect to cable laying, installations and marine
renewable energy. The MOU involves key public and private stakeholders.
These are the states, but also their regulators and the European Agency of
Electricity Regulators (ACER), as well as the private operators of the
electricity transmission systems through their forum of cooperation (ENTSO-
E), and the European Commission.112 This multi-level and public–private
structure serves to enhance the eﬀectiveness and legitimacy of its outcomes,
although neither NGOs nor civil society as such are involved. Industry and
research have been consulted through the ‘Adamowitsch group’.113 A Steering
Group composed of government and Commission representatives oversees,
and a Programme Board consisting of representatives of the Steering
Committee and representatives of the national regulators (ACER and
ENTSO-E) manages, the work of three working groups.114 The mandate of
110 < http://www.eu-norway.org/news1/Norway-joins-cooperation-on-energy-grid-in-the-
North-Sea > .
111 The North Seas Countries’ Oﬀshore Grid Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), 3 December 2010. <http://www.ewea.org/ﬁleadmin/ﬁles/library/publications/research-
notes/MoU_deﬁnitief.pdf> .
112 See the letters of intent of ACER, Annex 4, the national regulatory authorities, Annex 5, and
ENTSO-E, Annex 6 of the MOU (n 111).
113 See EU Coordinator, Fourth Annual Report, 15 November 2011, Annex II (Fourth Report),
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/tent_e/doc/oﬀ_shore_wind/2011_annual_report_annex2_
en.pdf>. Mr Adamowitsch was appointed in 2007 as European Coordinator for the oﬀshore wind
power in Northern Europe (North Sea–Baltic Sea) pursuant to Decision (EC) 1364/2006 laying
down guidelines for trans-European energy networks (TEN-E), [2006] OJ L 262/1.
114 The mandates, objectives, timeframes and methodologies of the Working Groups are set out
in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of the MOU.
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Working Group 1 is to design grid scenarios, on the basis of existing
governmental and industry policies and planning. Centralized decision-making
is excluded, ensuring that responsibility for the conﬁguration of the grid will
remain with the Transmission System Operators. The second Working Group
is concerned with market and regulatory issues such as oversight and access.
The third Working Group is to identify where the incompatibility of national
regimes on authorizations and planning acts as barrier to fast and coordinated
procedures. The governance structure of the MOU ties in with models of
decentralized governance increasingly used where the realization of EU
objectives depends on the bottom-up coordination of national laws rather than
their full harmonization.115 The normative output of this governance structure
is to be informal.116 Non-binding standards may be developed for the
coordination of national laws, procedures and planning, and not necessarily
their harmonization, which can then be implemented into binding national law
by the participants. The MOU’s machinery is also set up to integrate the
existing legal framework, as deﬁned by European and international law,117
particularly on environmental impact assessments in accordance with the
Espoo Convention118 and the two European Directives.119 Carrying out an
environmental impact assessment in transboundary projects is also a
requirement of customary international law.120
The MOU delivered a report at the end of 2012 that recommended
continuing the approach of realizing the grid through intergovernmental
cooperation. This outcome is not a blueprint, but a suggestion that cooperation
between the Northern seas countries should continue to be the way to proceed
in developing the electricity infrastructure needed to absorb the renewable
capacity. The report comprises reports from each Working Group. That of WG
I identiﬁes and compares two scenarios: ‘radial’—point-to-point connection of
115 Further G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart
2006).
116 cf de Búrca and Scott ibid, ‘Introduction’ for the relation between new (informal)
governance and law.
117 MOU (n 111) Annex 3, pt 1.
118 MOU (n 111) Annex 3, pt 6. The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, 25 February 1991, entry into force 10 September 1997, 1989 UNTS 309
(Espoo Convention) is a regional treaty concluded within the UNECE, which the 2001 amendment
— not yet force—opens to all UN member states. The EU, its member states and Norway are party
to the Convention.
119 Directive No 85/337/EEC of the Council on the assessment of the eﬀects of certain public
and private projects on the environment, [1985] OJ L 175/40, and Directive No 2001/42/EC of the
EP and the Council on the assessment of the eﬀects of certain plans and programmes on the
Environment, [2001] OJ L 197/30.
120 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (n 52), para 204; Responsibilities Opinion (n 30) para 145.
The EU is bound by customary international law, Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association of
America and Others, Judgment of 21 December 2011 (nyr) para 101. Customary international law
does not determine the content of an EIA, but the Espoo Convention concretizes that obligation for
its Parties; cf Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, para 205.
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oﬀshore wind farms and shore-to-shore interconnectors, which implies
continuing with uni- or bilateral solutions between countries, and ‘meshed’—
coordinated interconnector design that can form links between three or more
states via oﬀshore nodes, which implies multilateral cooperation between the
Northern seas states on joint cross-border assets, with the latter enjoying
an eﬃciency advantage.121 The report integrates the process of bilateral and
multilateral transborder infrastructure cooperation in the Northern Seas
including the several shore-to-shore interconnector projects currently being
planned or constructed between states.122 Thus the Northern seas grid in all
likelihood will be realized in a stepwise manner, i.e. hubs of wind energy
production will be connected to interconnectors.123 To remove barriers for
realizing such a meshed grid, Working Group II has drawn up a set of
principles to be used as guidelines for the development of cross-border
infrastructure. The principles cover issues such as planning, grid design,
ﬁnancing, operation of assets, ownership of assets and system charges. The aim
is to move towards a more common approach on the necessary investments. As
there are currently no arrangements at international, European or national level
for paying for integrated assets combining interconnection and oﬀshore
generation, WG II proposed that the national TSO ﬁnances infrastructure and
that the relevant regulator approves eﬃcient costs.124 For trading in renewables
there would need to be common models on support schemes for oﬀshore
renewable energy and agreed solutions on how to apportion costs for cross-
border projects between states. In its future work, the WG will take account of
the mechanisms that the novel European infrastructure Regulation 347/2013
contains.125 In order to remove barriers on planning and authorization, WG III
121 NSCOGI (Initial Findings), Working Group I Grid conﬁguration, Final Report (16
November 2012), <http://www.benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_WG1_OﬀshoreGridReport.pdf> .
On p 58, the report conﬁrms the results of the earlier study OﬀshoreGrid: Oﬀshore Electricity
Infrastructure in Europe, October 2011, prepared by 3e, a team of seven industry partners, <http://
mainstream-downloads.opendebate.co.uk/downloads/OﬀshoreGrid_report_complete_[1].pdf> .
See also OFGEM, Memorandum (ESG 09), European Supergrid Report (n 4).
122 The WG 1 Report lists these by country. See also the lists contained in European Supergrid
Report (n 4) Annex II, ‘Diﬀerent Supergrid Proposals and Work Streams in 2011’, and in Oﬀshore
Transmission Technology (n 10) 27–34. Links are planned between Norway and the UK
(Scotland), UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘One North Sea: Joint Ministerial
Statement on Climate Change and Energy Security’, Press Release 2010/096; Scottish
Government, Memorandum (ESG 26) for European Supergrid Report, and between Ireland and
the UK.
123 NSCOGI WG 1 Report; OﬀshoreGrid (n 121) 14. For early design suggestions see Working
Group for oﬀshore and onshore grid development in Northern Europe, Modular design for the
Development of the Oﬀshore/Onshore Grid in the North Sea (March 2009), <http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/infrastructure/tent_e/doc/oﬀ_shore_wind/2009_oﬀ_shore_grid_workshop_opening.pdf> .
124 NSCOGI, Working Group 2 Market and Regulatory Issues, Discussion Paper Deliverable 5,
Possible Market Arrangements for Integrated Oﬀshore Networks (13 March 2013), <http://www.
benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_Discussion_Paper_Possible_Market_Arrangements_Integrated_
Oﬀshore_Networks.pdf> .
125 NSCOGI,Working Group 2 Market and Regulatory Issues, Final Report Deliverable 2,
Recommendations for Guiding Principles for the Development of Integrated Oﬀshore Cross-border
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has initially drawn up a set of general principles for NSCOGI states to use as
guidelines for the authorization of cross-border transmission infrastructure.126
The objective is to coordinate rather than harmonize national procedures. The
Espoo Convention is identiﬁed as an eﬀective standard for conducting of
environmental impact assessments of transboundary grid projects, engaging
both ‘parties of origin’ in whose territorial sea or EEZ construction will take
place and other parties which may be aﬀected by the project in some way.127
The Espoo Convention applies ‘as a minimum’ at the project level (Article 2
(7)), and its additional Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment
obliges Parties to undertake environmental impact assessments on policies,
plans and programmes as well.128 The Espoo Convention cannot be applied
directly since cable laying is not listed in its Appendix I,129 but Parties could
agree speciﬁcally that it apply to grid projects in two ways. Parties may agree to
treat a non-listed activity as if it were listed because it is likely to cause a
signiﬁcant adverse transboundary impact. Criteria for identifying such impact
are set forth in Appendix III (Article 2(5)). Implementation of the Convention
can also be by separate international agreement guided by the elements listed in
Appendix VI (Article 8). A precedent for such ad hoc agreed application of the
Convention is the Baltic ‘Nordstream pipeline’.130 Finally, Appendix I could
be amended to include submarine cables in the normal amendment procedure
(Articles 10, 14).
This initial outcome was endorsed in December 2012 by the Energy
Ministers of the NSCOGI participants who recognized that this type of regional
cooperation was needed to bring about investment in cross-border infrastruc-
ture.131 Ministers asked the relevant actors—network operators, ENTSO-E,
ACER and national regulators—to continue working with governments and the
Commission on possible future grid conﬁgurations for the Northern seas, and
to develop further concretizing proposals to address the regulatory, market and
planning barriers.
Infrastructure (23 November 2012), <http://www.benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_WG2_
HighLevelPrinciplesRevisedFinal.pdf> .
126 NSCOGI, Working Group 3 Procedural Guidelines, Final Report Deliverable 2, Procedural
Guidelines as a Recommendation to the National Competent Authorities (without date), <http://
www.benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_WG3_ProceduralGuidelines.pdf> .
127 NSCOGI WG 3 Report, 9.
128 The Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Espoo Convention, 21 May
2003, entry into force 11 July 2010, ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2, is now in force for the EU, its member
states, and Norway.
129 The ‘list of activities’ in Appendix I as amended, mentions ‘large diameter pipelines’ (No 8),
‘overhead electrical power lines (No 20), and ‘wind farms’ (No 22), but not submarine cables.
130 The Russian Federation has signed but not ratiﬁed the Espoo Convention. Yet for the
purposes of the Nord Stream project, it has been acting as a ‘Party of origin’ as far as it considers it
possible according to its legislation.
131 <http://www.benelux.int/NSCOGI/NSCOGI_PressReleaseDecember2012.pdf> .
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VII. INTEGRATING INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LAW
Cooperative governance of oﬀshore electricity infrastructure in the Northern
seas depends on the combined eﬀect of international, European and national
law. This type of interaction does not easily ﬁt any of the received conceptions
of the relationship between these legal orders. Concepts of international law
such as fragmentation,132 the sectoral specialization of treaties,133 or a merely
general interaction between treaties,134 share certain presuppositions, most
importantly the essential isolation of each legal order and the deﬁnition of its
static relationship with others through ‘conﬂicts’ principles that are ultimately
judicially determined. These twin presuppositions also underlie the doctrine of
the autonomy of European law from international law as understood by the
ECJ,135 and the corresponding doctrine of the autonomy of international law
from regional law as understood by the ICJ.136 The reality of the shared
oﬀshore electricity infrastructure in the Northern seas is, however, not
compatible with these presuppositions. Here, the relevant international treaties
on the climate and the oceans, European law and national law are not isolated
from each other. Nor do they interact in an unspeciﬁed way. Rather they
become functionally integrated in an overarching scheme: each legal order
fulﬁls a speciﬁc and indispensable function for dynamically realizing the
shared objective of the grid.
This integration is not the work of a central authority. Rather each legal order
evolves through autonomous action to fulﬁl its respective function. Such action
bears ﬁrst of all on the conception of its relationship with external law as being
one of complementarity for the achievement of common objectives. This is
true for the international climate regime which does not purport to achieve the
climate priorities of the international community directly, but depends on other
elements of the international law framework, particularly the major pre-
existing law-making treaties such as UNCLOS.137 The law of the sea in turn
absorbs the novel climate priorities set by the international community and
realizes them within its own system of governance and through principles
132 See Report on Fragmentation (n 76), Conclusions, mitigated by the assumption that
international law overall forms a system, paras 1, 17–23.
133 For such an understanding of UNCLOS and the climate regime see D Rothwell and
T Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart 2010) 168.
134 See A Boyle, ‘Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for
Change’, (2005) 54 ICLQ 563, 578–84.
135 For instance Opinion 1/09 on the international European and Community Patents
Court, [2011] ECR 1137; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05P, Kadi [2008] ECR 6351.
See generally J Klabbers, ‘The Validity of EU Norms Conﬂicting with International Obligations’ in
E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti and R Wessels (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union
(Nijhoﬀ 2012) 111.
136 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal),
Judgment of 20 July 2012 (nyr) para 111.
137 Following established terminology, law-making treaties protect common concerns of the
international community, rather than just creating reciprocal obligations for states; see J Pauwelyn,
Conﬂicts of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 52–89.
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of interpretation. The alternative mechanism is law-making through the treaty’s
machinery, through implementing treaties, or any other suitable arrange-
ments.138 But international climate priorities also reach through to any regional
organization to which states have transferred relevant responsibilities, and
which may draw on its law-making machinery for absorbing and realizing the
international community’s objective. Here, for example, European secondary
law has developed principles that underpin the cooperative harvesting of
marine renewable energy through a shared grid. Finally, international climate
priorities reach through to the level of national law, where each of the several
legal orders is coordinated by states through appropriate regional intergovern-
mental mechanisms that can then engage not just the states themselves but also
with other competent public actors and key private actors.
This functional integration of international law, European law and national
law in the pursuit of ocean space governance is transferable to other instances
where international law, European and national laws need to work together to
bring about an internationally deﬁned objective.139 That is not to say that
conﬂicts between international law and (primary) European law cannot arise,
only that these instances can be managed through appropriate secondary law-
making that seeks to ensure their integration.140
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The article has argued that the objective of shared large-scale oﬀshore
electricity infrastructure for marine renewable exploitation as envisaged for the
Northern seas can be realized through the functional integration of
international law, European law and national law. This integration means that
each of these legal orders plays a speciﬁc role in achieving the common
objective. The international climate regime determines the impetus for
establishing oﬀshore electricity grids as a means of mitigating climate change
through renewable energy use. The law of the sea deﬁnes the competent state
for each grid element. European law generates principles for their cooperation,
which are then implemented through national law of both EU member states
and non-member states coordinated within the intergovernmental mechanism
138 cf B Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?’ (2011) 59 ICLQ
573, 581–4 (investment contracts for achieving of human rights objectives in investment law).
139 For examples ranging from solidarity to non-discrimination to the environment see Sabel
and Zeitlin (n 106).
140 For instance, the ‘constitutional’ conﬂict between the international anti-terrorism objective
and European fundamental rights has been managed through secondary law-making both at UN
and European levels, see Opinion of Advocate General Bot of 19 March 2013 in Joined Cases
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi II, and Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009
amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain speciﬁc restrictive measures directed
against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and
the Taliban, [2009] OJ L 346/42.
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of the NSCOGI. Each of these legal orders fulﬁls its responsibility through
autonomous action and, as a result, each changes structurally.
But the legal ordering of shared oﬀshore electricity grids also is a salient
example of a broader trend in the interaction of international, European and
national law. That trend does not so much ﬁt any of the general theories which
are essentially based on the autonomy of in particular European law, and which
focus very much on court-resolved conﬂicts between them. In reality,
increasingly international, European and national law work together. Global
energy and environmental objectives have been particular drivers of this trend,
but it has also manifested itself with respect to policies ranging from anti-
terrorism to international monetary stability. This trend illustrates the way in
which the functional integration of international law, European law and
national law is emerging as a distinct legal institution in its own right, separate
and distinct from the various legal orders themselves.141
141 See N MacCormick, Institutions of Law (OUP 2007) 31–4. He primarily focuses on the legal
institutions of the constitutional state, but acknowledges that legal institutions can also form outside
of this context.
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